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ABSTRACf
The functional form of consumer allocation models should be able to
satisfy theoretícal properties derived from the theory of consumer
demand. The paper sketches four approaches that meet this condition.
Of course, also empirical performance matters. Next to riaíve goodness-
of-fit comparison, non-neated hypothesis testíng can be employed. The
latter technique is applied to a comparison of four versions of dif-
ferential demand systems : the Rotterdam system, a version of the
Almost Ideal Demend (AID) system, the (B,S system and the NBR system.
These systems are artificially nested in a more general model using
scalar weights in contrast to Barten and McAleer (1991) who use matrix
weights for this purpose. Annual data over the period 1921-1981 for
The Netherlands for four major groups of consumer expenditure have
been used for the empirical applícation. The GBS syatem dominates the
others. As a byproduct of this approach a general form, the S~nthetíc
system, results which is more flexíble than the elementary models
mentioned.
JEL Nos : 211, 212, 920
Keywords : Non-nested hypothesis testing; Demand systems; Choice of
functional form
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lier draft of the paper.1. IMROIX1Ci'IOIV
Consumer allocation systems indicate how the consumer allocates hís
means over the purchase of varioua commodities, sometimes also in-
cluding leisure. These models are usually explicitly based on the
microeconomic theory of consumer demand, which supplies quite some
useful information for the empirical implementatlon of such systema.
Allocatíon problema are close to the foundationa of economics which,
in the eyes of some, ís concerned with the optimal allocation of given
means over varioua alternatives, or, its dual, the minimal use of
means to reach a given set of objectíves. Allocation models are beíng
formulated not only for consumer demand but also for demand for ínputs
into productlon, compositíon of imports by country of orígin, ínveat-
ment portfolio's and agrícultural acreage allotment. In all these
cases the varlables explaíned by these models are, dlrectly or índi-
rectly, the arguments of an objective function minímized or maximized
under one or more constralnts. The system reflecta the curvature of
the obJective function andlor that of the constraint(s).
fYhile these allocation syatems are based on the economíc theory of
individual behaviour they are moat often applied to aggregate beha-
viour for a market or for an economy as a whole. In fact, exact ag-
gregation is only possible under rather restrictive condítions. Con-
sistent aggregation ls lesa restrictive but holda only asymptotícally.
Given that one cannot expect an allocation syatem to reflect faith-
fully the structure implied by micro theory, one can atíll impose thís
structure, if it is not spontaneoualy reproduced, on the estimatíon of
the system in order to save on degrees of freedom in an interpretable
way. Gíven the usually limited time serles, econo~ of parameters is
a must.2
After a general discussion of the theoretícal foundations of consumer
allocation systems, the criteria for choice of a partícular functional
form and the evaluation of ita empirical performance, the paper turns
to a class of four differential demand systems which are Sn a sense
similar and therefore easily comparable. The attentlon is concentrated
on their relative empirical performence as a basis of choíce. Rather
than limítíng oneself to a single system one can consider a linear
combínation of these systems as an alternative which can do more jus-
tice to the data than any of the elementary systems.
2. T1~EfICAL SAIXGROUND
S~mmaries of the type of consumer theory leading to systems of demand
theory can be found in Deaton and Muellbauer (1980b), Barten and Bóhm
(1982) and Deaton ( 1986). Here we wíll 11mít ourselves to some basic
statements.
Under suitable assumptions about the preferences of the consumer these
can be represented by a utillty function
(1} u(41. -.-. qn)
with as arguments the, usually positive, quan[ities, qi, of a finíte
number of commodities, n. This function is increasing and stríctly
quasi-concave in the quantitíes. It is usually taken to be at least
twice differentiable. The vector of first-order derívatives,
uq w[aulaq;], is the n-veccor of marginal utílities and is positive
given the increasing nature of u(q), q-[qi]. The n x n matríx of
second-order derivatives, u-[a~u~aqaq~] ia a symmetrlc matrix. The
stríct quasi-concave nature of (1) reflects itself in the condítion
that :
(2) x~Ux S 0, Vx ~ 0, uyx - 03
The consumer's means m are non-zero bu[ finlte. They are used to pay
piqi, i- 1. .. , n, for the desíred amounts of the commodíties. where
pi is che positíve unit price of commodity i. These expenditures
satisfy the budget equation
(3) ~iPiqi - m
The consumer will select the vector q among alternative vectors that
satisfy (3) which meximizes his utility (1). Mathematically, this
amounts to maximizing the utility function subject to (3). The first-
order conditions, next to (3) are
(4) uq - 1`p
where ~ ia a(scalar) posltive I.agrange multiplier and p-[pi] is the
n-vector of prices. Conditions (4) exprees the Second law of Goasen
(1854). Together with (3) these are being solved for ~ and q. The
latter solutions are the (Marshallian) demand functlons
(5) qi - fi(m. Pi. .- . Pn) í - 1. ..., n
To guarantee differentiabílity on the interior of the commodity space
stríct quasi-concavity conditíon (2) has to be strengthened to
x~Ux C 0, Vx ~ 0, uyx - 0
which is lmown as strong quasi-concavíty. Dífferentiabilíty of the
Marshallian demand functíons (5) is of ínterest because most empirical
versions are dífferentiable and because the restrictions theory ier
plíes are most conveniently expressed in terms of derivatives of (5)
or in terms of elasticíties whích are derivatives of the logaríthmic
version of (5).
Indeed write
(6) dln qi - ni dln m t Ej pi j dln pj i, j- 1. ..., nfor the logarithmíc differential of (5). The rli is the income (budget,
means) elasticity of the demand for commodity í and p;j the price
elasticity. These elasticitíes should satisfy a set of properties
- see Frisch (1959) - which Snvolve the budget share wi, defined as
Piqi~m. Note that (3) implies that Eiwi - 1. Some of these proper-
ties can be conveniently expressed in terms of the Slutshy or coaipen-
sated prtce elasttctty, eij, defined as :
(7) eij - piJ 4 Tliw7
This elasticity represents the substitution effect of príce changes,
keeping utility constant.
First, one has the adding-up condtttons, guaranteeing that explained
demand satísfíes the budget equation (3) :
(~) EiwiTli - 1 (Engel aggregation)
(gb) EiwiJ1ij - -wj (Cournot aggregation)
which together imply, using (7)
(Sc) Eiwíe;j - 0 (Slutsky aggregatíon)
Next, there are the homogeneity condtttons reflectíng the llnear
homogeneity of (3) in the pí and m:
(~) Ej ~i j - -71i
(9b) Ej eij - 0
A property of considerable empirical Smportance i s that of Slutsky
symmetry
(10) wiEij - wjEji5
One next has the negatiuity condltíon
(11) E;Ej XjwjE;jXj C 0 x;, xj ~ constant
The Slutsky elasticíties may reflect partlcular structures of the
preference order or of the utility function. If the preference order
can be represented by a utílíty functíon whích is a sum of n functions
ín each of the quantítles :
(12) E;j-~pr;i (ó; j- nj wj ) (complete independence)
with ~p being the reciprocal of xhat Frísch terms "money flexibility"
and ó;j a Kronecker delta. It ís an extreme parameter reductlon cor-
respondíng to the very rigid ínteraction pattern ímplied by the ad-
ditivity of utility.
A less rigid structure is the one of groupwlse aeparability of the
preference order and utility function. Here the commodlties are or-
ganízed in non-overlapping groups and the utlllty function is written
as a function of separate utility functione for each group. Then for
commodity i, being part of group F, and commodity J, belonging to
group C. F~ G, one has
(13) E; j--r~ ninj wj (weak separability)
where ~FG -`~GF is in common to all interactiona between commodities
of group F and those of group G. Property (13) reflects ~oeak separa-
b111ty. Strong aeparability ín groups corresponds to (13) with
~FG -~~ i.e. the same for all group lnteractions. Clearly, when all
groups consíst of one good only one has the case of complete índepen-
dence.
Separabilíty ís conveníent because it allows one to formulate complete
allocation systems for each group separately, given the means to be
spent on che group. The allocation of the means over the groups ís6
determined in a higher level model in terms of group chara,cteristics
only.
Nomothetíc preferences express themselves in the property that
(14) ~li - 1. di
It represents an extreme in income sensítivity. It implíes that budget
shares do not vary with income.
A related concept, which has proved íta use, is that of the indirect
uttlity function
(15) u~(m, P1. .-.. Pn)
which is obtained by replacing ín (1) the qi by the optimlzing quanti-
ties given by (5). Its differential form can be written as
(16) du' - Ei(aulaqi)C(afi~am)dm t Ej(áfilópj)dPj]
-~(EiwiTli dln m t EiEjwi{iíj dln Pi )
- Jvn(dln m- Ej wj dln pj )
where use has been made of the Gossen conditions ( 4) and adding-up
conditíons (8a) and (8b). It appears that A, the Lagrange multiplier
in (4), is au~Iam, i.e. the margínal utility of the budget. From (16)
one can derive demend functions by way of the rule of Roy (1942) :
(17) qi - -(~Pi )(a1~PS ~ ain.m)
IVote that in (I6) dln m- Ejwj dln pj can be seen as a kind of real
income change. Ej wj dln pj is a(change in a) price index which ís
used to defiate m. Constant real íncome means no change in utílíty.7
Another way to look at thís concept of real íncome is to start from
the logaríthmic differentlal of budget equatíon (3) :
(18) dln m- Ej wj dln pj f Ej wj dln qj
and to write
(19) Ej wj dln qj - dln a~ - Ej wj dln pj
where the left-hand side varlable is a(change Sn a) quantity lndex
corresponding to the (change in) real íncome on the right-hand side.
In the sequel we will use the notation
(2A) dln Q- Ej wj dln qj , dln P - Ej wj dln pj
to indicate these quantity and price índexes. With (18) one then has :
(21) dln m- dln P f dln Q
Another concept of practical use is the expenditure functton whích can
be derived from ( 15) by expressíng m in terms of u and p:
e(u~ P~. .. . Pn).
IC glves the mínimum expenditure needed to reach utility level u given
prlces p~, .... pn. From (16) ít follows that ita dlfferential form
can be written as :
dln e -[lI(J~n)]du t Ejwj dln pj .
which serves as the basís for the Shephard ( 1953) formula :
(24) w1 - óln e~81n pj. 1- 1. .. , n
yielding demand equations of the type(~`) 9i - hi(u. Pt. -. . Pn). í- 1. .. , n,
also known as Hícksian demand equations. Replacing u in (25) by
u~(m, pt, ..., pn) one is back to the llarshallian demand equations
(5).
Another way to provide the link between the two types of demand equa-
tions is to start from (6), use (7) and (16) to obtain
(26) dln qi -[1~(~m)]r~idu t Ejeij dln pj
which ís the logarithmic differential version of (25). From thts ex-
presaíon Che nature of eij ae utllíty conatant price elasticitles is
clear.
Quite a bit more can be said about the theoretical foundations of
applíed demand analysís. For the purpose at hand the present summary
may suffice.
3- ~PPROA~~S TO FUNCPICltA[. SPDCIFIGTI01~1
In econometrics the ideal specification should be consistent wíth
theory, easy to estimate and fit the data, which includes good predic-
tion performance. Practíce falls short of the ideal and usually a
reasonable compromise has to be struck between the three requirements.
In the case of the formulation of demand allocatlon systems "theory"
consists of the properties of the demand equations outlined ín the
previous sectíon. Even though those properties are deríved for the
single consumer one would like them to be present for the average or
aggregate agent as well.9
There are basically four approaches to arrive at demand equations sa-
tisfying the properties in question. The fírst one starts off from a
functionally specified, increasíng and strongly quasi-concave utilíty
function (1), which is maximized subject to budget constraint (3).
The first-order condítions are solved for the quantíties as a functíon
of prices and íncome. The parameters of the utility function are the
constants of the demand equations. The best-known e~mmple of this
approach ís the Linear Expenditure System (LFS) - for a survey see
Deaton (1975). The underlying utility function can be written as
u- EiQi ln(qi - t{ ) . Ej Qj - 1 ~ 71 ~ qí
The resultíng demand equations are :
(28) qi - ~i t(Qi ~Pí )(m - Ej Pj 7j )
The additive nature of (27) clearly reflects the assumption of com-
plete independence of the preference order. Fmpirically. (28) is
rather restrictive. It is also not so easy to estimate. In (28) the
7j appear in all equations in a nonlinear combination with the Qi,
while the requirement that the 7; are smaller than the smallest obser-
vable qí value ís not so easíly met by the data. The first, not ideal,
application of the LES is by Stone (1954). It took until Parks (1971)
and Solari (1971) before it could be adequately eatimated.
More generally, it appears that starting from a well-specified utility
function one cannot obtain empirícally interestíng demand functions.
The second approach starts off from a functionally specífíed Sndirect
utility function (15) and applies Roy's rule (17) to arrive at estima-
ble demand functions. An example is the Indirect Translog Utility
Function of Christensen et a1. (1975) :
(2g) u~ - a t Ei Qi 1n(Pi ~m) t SS Ei Ej Pi j ln(Pi Im) ln(pj ~m)
with E;(3i --1 and Rij - Rji resulting in10
wi -
Qi t Ej Qij ln(pj ~m)
-1 f EkEj Rkj ln(Pk~m)
The system is nonlinear in its parameters and not so easy to estímate.
Moreover it is impossible to satisfy the condition that u~ ís monotone
increasing in m, or decreasing in the general price level for all pos-
síble valuea of the prlces and m, whích can be qulte awkward in pre-
diction and símulatíon exercises. Moreover, negative predíctions of
the value shares cannot be excluded.
The income elasticíty ni associated wíth (30) is
(31) ni - 1-(Ej Ri j ~w; - EkEj Rkj )~x
with x being the denominator of (30). For the Slutsky elasticity eij,
multiplied by w9, one has
(32) wiEi j - (Qij- wi EkRkj - wj EkRi k t wi wj EkEI Pkl )Ix
which satisfies Slutsky aggregation condition (8c), homogeneity condi-
tion (9b) and symmetry conditlon (10). Controlling the signs of the
Rij does not guarantee negatívity conditíon (11), however. Building
separability into (30) is a rather compllcated affair sínce it is not
a special case of the choice of constants. Still, as is evident from
(30) or (32) the system allows for empirically interesting lnterac-
tions to express themselves in an appropríate value of the relevant
Qi j. 7~he system becomes homothetic by símply setting Ej (3i j- 0 for
all i. This property can thus either be built into the system, or be
tested or both without essentially changing the functional specifica-
tíon.
The third approach bases itself on a specified expenditure function
(22). Application of Shephard's lemma (24) results in Hicksian demand
equatíons (25) from which the unobservable utility level ís eliminated
using the expenditure function to express it in terms of m and p. The11
best lmown example of this type of specification ís the Almost Ideal
Demand (AID) system oF Deaton and Muellbauer (1980a). Its expenditure
function in logarlthmic form reads
33 lneu, -a tEa ln tKEE.r ln c ( ) ( P) o i i Pi i ~ i j Pi ln pj t u IIj pj 1
wi th r;j- rj ;, Eiai - 1, Ei rij- 0, F,cj - 0. Use of Shephard' a lemma
results in
c.
(34) wi - ai } ci u IIj pj í } Ej ril ln pj
Eliminatíng u gives
with
wi - si t c; (ln m- ln P~ ) t Ej rij ln pj
ln P~ - ap } Ekakln pk t SS EkEjrkjln pk ln pj
A varíatit of the AID system uses :
(37) ln P, - Ekwkln Pk
Imown as Stone's index. With (37) the budget share equatíons are
linear in the parameters to be estímated, víz., ai, c; and the rij.
With (36) for ln P,~ the estimation problem is more complicated.
The income elasticíty implied by (35) is
Tli - 1 t ci ~wi
Homotheticity clearly corresponds with ci - 0 for all i, which ís easy
to impose if one sees a reason for it. The implied Slutsky elastici-
ties differ according to the use of (36) or of (37). In the first
case, they are, multiplíed by wi :(39) wi Ei j- ri j t ci cj ( ln m- ln P~ )- wi óij t wi wj
In the second case one has
wiE{j - r~j - wióij t wiwj
It is easy to check that the adding-up, homogeneíty and symmetry con-
ditions are satisfied. The negativíty condition ís leas easily repro-
duced by the system. It cannot be controlled by restrícting the value
of the estimated parameters and cannot be guaranteed for all p and m
combinations. The qualifica[ion "Almost" in the name of the system is
due to this ahortcoming. Another problem ís the fact that aeparabilíty
structures are not nested in the general specification. However, as
is clear from (35) apecífic interactíona between commodíties can be
captured easíly. In simulations values of wi outside the (0, 1) inter-
val cannot be excluded. In fact, a basic weakness of (35) is that va-
riations in wi, which in principle are limíted to the (0, 1) interval,
are linked to variations in ln m over the (-m, tm) interval by the
constant ci. The only value of ci which doea not lead to problems is
zero, which implies homothetic preferences. A simílar complicatíon
occurs for the measurement of the price effects.
We now turn to the fourth approach. Many early empirical demand atu-
dies worked with double-logarithmic specifícations and constant elas-
ticitiea. They appear to function well empirically but are less ade-
quate in reflecting the theoretical restrictions outlined in the pre-
víous sectíon. As we may note those restrictions, apart from homoge-
neity condition (9), involve budget shares next to the elasticíties.
To satisfy those properties constant elasticítíes require constant
budget shares. This is theoretically unlntereating and empirically
inacceptable.
Byron (1970) working with a double-logarithmic system imposed the
theoretical constraints on the estimation using the sample averages of
the budget shares. In thís way the restrictíons contríbute to the13
statistical effíciency of the estimation. St111, for purposes of simu-
lation, one can expect that the explained parts will not swe to the
given total, to mention just one of the possible conflicts.
Theíl (1965) also started off from a double-logarithmic speclfication
like (6) with u;j replaced by E;j using (7) :
dln q; - n; (dln m- Ej wj dln pj ) t Ej e; j dln pj
Multíplying both sídes through by w; reaults Sn
(41) w; dln q; - bi (dln m- Ej wj dln pj ) f Ej s;j dlnpj
where b; - w;rli and s;j - wie;j are now treated as constants. Thís
choice of constants ís known as the Rotterdnm system. It is quickly
verlfíed that Engel and Slutsky aggregation imply
Eibi - 1 . E;s1j - 0 .
whíle the homogeneity condition amounts to
(43) Ej s; j - 0.
Symmetry conditton ( 10) translates into
(44) sij - sj í -
The negativity conditíon now becomes
(45) E;Ejx;s;jxj ~ 0 xí, xj ~ constant.
All these conditions are in terms of the constants of the aystem and
can thus either be tested or built !n. Another attractive property of
this choice of parameters is that specíal preference structurea are
special cases. For complete independence one has14
sij - W bi (bij- bj )
while weak separability expresses itself as
(47) sii - - wFGbibi
when í and j belong to groups F and G, respectively. For strong sepa-
rabílity the .pFG is replaced by ~p.
Sínce r~i - bilwi, homotheticity can only be imposed for bi - w; for
all 1, i .e. makíng the wi constant also with reapect to price changes.
Replacing in (41) the differentials by first differences and wi by
wit -(wit t wit-1)~2 one has a relatively simply estimable system.
The modei is general ín the sense that each S,j ínteractíon is repre-
senced by its own s;j. Note one Iímitatlon. Because r,; - b;~w; the
sign of ni is determined by that of bi. A commodity is estimated to
be ínferíor (bi ( 0, r)i ( O) or to be non-inferior (bi Z O, rti Z 0).
In the latter case it can be a normal good (bi S wi. ni S 1) or a
luxury (bi ) wi, rli ) 1). It can change from a luxury into a normal
good or vice versa depending on the change in wi. It cannot change
from a non-inferior good to an inferior good. An analogous property
is present in the AID system. As is clear from (38) the sign of ci
determínes whether r;i is larger than one or not. A good is a luxury
or a necessity, without the possibility of a change depending on the
exogenous variables. If a good is a necessity !t can change from a
normal good to an inferíor good or vice versa. Both the constant bi
of the Rotterdam system and the constant ci of the AID system appear
to be restríctive. Intuítively, one would like a specification whích
allows a good to go through an (economic) life cycle, beginning as a
luxury, becoming normal and finally inferior as available means for
consumption lncrease. With the usual level of aggregatíon of goods
inferiority is rarely observed, however, reducing the practical impor-
tance of the limitation of the constant bi.15
Of the four approaches considered here, the fírst one, starting off
from a functionally specified direct utllity function, is least at-
tractive because it does not lead to "interestíng" demand aystems.
Thía also means that the "interesting" systems produced by the three
other approaches cannot be integrated to yíeld a direct utillty func-
tion. The systems resultíng from the second and third approach have
by construction an associated indirect utility function and an asso-
ciated expendSture function. Th1s cannot be taken for granted for
systems resultíng from the fourth approach. Still, for given levels
of real income and a set of prices one can also in that case determine
the corresponding mínimal nominal expenditure numerically, makíng wel-
fare comparísons possible.
The systems considered as examples are all regularly used in practice.
From a theoretical point of view they have their advantages and dis-
advantages. Some of them are more easy to estimate than others. To
estímatíon appliea, mutatis mutandis, the army adage "1'intendance
suivrá'. It is a matter of tlme and computer power to crack the
toughest nuts in that area. What about emplrical performance of such
systems ? This i s the toplc of the next section.
4. f][PIRIGL I'IIZFORMAN~
In discussíng empírical performance one can distinguish between poten-
tial performance for any set of relevant data and actual performance
for a particular set of data.
The fírst type of performance has to a certain extent already been
dlscussed in the previous section because ít is very much related to
the theoretlcal properties of the system. We have seen that of the
four systems considered as an example, three víz. the Línear Expendi-
ture System, the Indírect Translog system and the Almost Ideal Demand
system, cannot maintaín proper curvature conditions over the whole16
(p, m) space. Otherwíse saíd, they break down as demand ailocation
systems for particular combinatíons of the exogenous variables of the
system. How important thís ís 1n actual applications is difficult to
say. This defect simply reflects that demand systems are at best a
local approximation to the true state of affaírs. How local is local ?
A related issue is that of flextbtLtty íntroduced by Diewert (1971).
A demand functíon is considered to be a flextble furuttorwl fora if ít
is derived from an aggregator function (direct or indírect utílíty
function, expendlture function) which is a second-order approximation
to the relevant true one. It means that the demand functions them-
selves are first-order approximatíons and that there ís some poínt in
the space of exogenous variables where the derlvatives of these appro-
ximate demand functiona are equal to the true ones. The Itxlirect
Translog and the Almost Ideal Demand system are in this sense flexlble
functional forms, the Línear Expenditure Syatem is not.
Nhat mattera is not so much the nature of the aggregator function as
well as the nature of the demand functions as a llnear approximation,
requiring that in each demand function each of the exogenous variables
has its own lmpact. In thls sense also the Rotterdam system qualífíes
as a flexible functional form - see also Deaton (1986).
An unfortunate byproduct of the Diewert flexib111ty concept is the
tendency to formulate the aggregator functions as quadratic forms in
the arguments which me3ces it ímpossible to guarantee monotonicity over
the full range of the exogenous varlables, resulting in the type of
curvature conflicts mentioned earlier.
A related approach is the one used by Kiefer and MacKinnon (1976).
One generates data using one system, adds random terms and estimates
other systems. Flexíbility expresses ítself in the ability to explain
the data as well as the system used to generate the data. How does one
measure such relative performance 717
This brings us to the issue of actual empirical performance where a
similar measurement íssue prevails. One compares two or more systems
usíng the same set of data on the quantities and the prices. These
systems are estimated and their goodness-of-fít ís compared. Thís
sounds easier than it is. The usual goodness-of-fit measure is the R~,
the coefficient of determination. These can be calculated for each
equatíon of the system and compared acrosa systems. However, the de-
pendent varíables are not necessarily the same for the various systema
and then the R~ is not such a meaníngful measure of relative perfor-
mance. Moreover, one wants to compare systems as a whole and not
equation-by-equation.
In the first attempt of empírical comparison of various demand systems
Parks (1969) uses the average informatíon inaccuracy concept of Theil
(1967). It basically compares the budget shares generated by the es-
timated system with the actual ones, taking the (weighted) average
over the equations and over the sample. A relatively high average
informatíon inaccuracy is taken to be an indicator of less satisfac-
tory behaviour. It is not clear to what extent thís measure favours
models with the budget shares as dependent variables over models with
other functions of the quantíties líke the Linear Expenditure Sjratem
or the Rotterdam model. The models do not necessarily estlmate the
same number of parameters. How to account for that difference ? In
general, what about the statistícal significance of the difference in
values for the average ínformation inaccuracy ? In spíte of these
open questíons the average information inaccuracy has been xidely used
- see for example Klevmarken (1979) and Barten (1989). The comparison
of the likelihood values as employed by Deaton (1974) has found little
support.
Whát one clearly needs is a statístical testing procedure allowing one
to make statements about the significance of the difference in empí-
rical performance. Some models are specíal cases of other models, are
nested within more general specifications. One can, for ínstance,
estimate the Rotterdam model, once with ímposing Slutsky symmetry and18
once wlthout imposing thls restrictíon. The former model is the spe-
cial case of the unrestrícted, more general, second model. The maxieum
likelihood value of the latter model will be larger than that of che
former one. Twice the dífference 1n the logaríthme of these values ís
(asymptotícally) distributed as X~ with as many degrees of freedom as
the number of restrictions involved, if the reatricted model !s the
true one. If dropping the restrictions increases the likelihood sig-
nificantly, the restrictions are clearly too "restrictíve" and are
refected by the data. Thls type of test has been used already for some
time - see, for example. Barten (1969). Similar approaches use the
Wald or the iagrange Multiplier test statistic.
When comparíng the empirical performance of alternatíve systems one
model ís usually not a speclal case of another model. The number of
coefflcíents of the two models may be different but one cannot reduce
one set to the other by simple manipulatlon. Otherwíse said, there is
no restricted version that could act as the natural null hypothesis.
Consider the AID model (35) with speclflcation (37) for In Py and the
Rotterdam model (41). They have the same number of coefficlents. They
are not nested within each other. One clearly needs a testing proce-
dure for non-nested alternatives.
The first one to apply non-nested testing to the comparison of demabe
systems is Deaton (1978). He applied it to models wíth the same de-
pendent variables. SLch a procedure can be used to compare, for ex-
ample, the indirect translog system (30) with the AID model (35) whích
both have the budget share as dependent variable. It ls not sultable
to compare, say, the AID system with, say, the Rotterdam system.
In Barten and McAleer (1991) an approach is proposed that can deal
also with non-nested models wíth different (vectors of) dependent va-
riables, which are non-linear data transformation of, say, the quan-
tities demanded. The method starts off from a hypothetical general
model made up out of a macríx weighted linear combínation of two or
more basic models. One solves for one of the dependent varíables and19
estimates consistently the transformed matríx weights asaociated with
the other models. Next, one tests whether these matrix weights are
significantly dífferent from zero. If this happens to be the case the
model for which the dependent variable is on the lef[-hand side falls
short in explaining reality on its own and could usefully employ some
of the informatíon contained in the other models in the linear combí-
natíon. Also here, there is no natural null model. Each model, in
turn, can yield the left-hand varlables of the estimated system. The
alternative modela consist then of the other modela taken one-by-one
or as pairs or as combinations of three, four, .. , models.
Càn those línear combinations themselves be consídered as a(synthe-
tic) demand allocation system ? There is no problem in letting them
satisfy the adding-up and homogeneíty condítions but the symnetry con-
ditions cannot be ímposed without reducing the matrix weíghts to
scalar matrices. Also the negativity condition catmot be controlled.
In the present paper we will consider scalar combinations of systems,
which can be used as demand systems in theír own right if one ís
willing to pay the price of not being able to satisfy the negativity
condition. The next section presents the models to be compared.
5. A Qa.SS OF DIFFERiIiI'IAL DF7IAAND FUNGTIOtIS
To maintain comparability with the emplrical application of Barten and
McAleer (1991) attention will be limited to a set of four models that
are on the one hand sufficiently dffferent to display differences in
empirical performance and are on the other hand suffícíently símilar
to allow for an interpretation of those differences.
Consíder Rotterdam model ( 41). Use ( 19) and (20) to rewríte it as
(48) wi dln qi - bi dln Q f Ej sij dln pj20
Thís is one member of the class of Four models. Next take AID model
(35), bring it into differentíal form, replace dln P~ by dln P of
(20), use (19) and (20) again to write
(49) dw; - c; dln Q t Ej r;j dln pj
Note the símilarity on the rlght-hand sldes of (48) and (49). The
left-hand sides are different, but related. Indeed one can write
dw; - w; dln q; t w; dln p; - w; dln m
which shows that w; dln q; is the quantíty component of the change in
budget share w; while w; dln p; and -w; dln m are due to the (exoge-
nous) changes in the price and total meana.
One can use (50) to show how the coefficients of (48) and (49) are
related. Replace w; dln q; in (50) by the right-hand side of (48) to
obtain
(51) dw; - b; dln Q t Ejs;j dln pj t w; dln p; - w; dln m
-(bi - w; )dln Q t Ej (s; j t w;ó; j- w;wj )dln pj
where (21) and (20) have been used to replace dln m. Comparison wíth
(49) shows equivalence for
(52) ci - bi - wi
(53) r; j- s;j t w; ó;j- w;wj
Note that the w; are taken to be variable and that taking the b; and
s;j to be constants ís essentially dífferent from taking the c; and
r;j to be constant. The two systems are different but comparable.21
Keller and van Driel (1985) created a hybrid of the AID and Rotterdam
systems by replacing in (48) bi by cí t w1 and moving w; dln Q to the
left-hand s1de. The resulting (~SS system reada :
(54) w; (dln q; - dln Q) - c; dln Q t Ej s{ j dln pj .
This system has the AID income coefficients ci and the Rotterdam price
coeffícients s;j. It shares with the two baeic models the adding-up,
homogeneity and symmetry conditions in terma of the coefflcients only.
It can also be made to satiafy the negatlvity condition. Complete
independence, weak and strong separab111ty, however, are not special
cases of this specification, as is evident from (46) and (47) where
the b{ rather than the c{ appear.
Neves (1987) considered another hybrid. He replaced the c{ in the AID
system (49) by b{ - wi to yleld the NBR system
dw; } w; dln Q- bl dln Q t Ej rij dln pj
I[ has the Rotterdam income coefficients and the AID price coeffi-
cients as constants. It can satisfy the regularity condítions of
adding-up, homogeneity and symmetry, but not that of negatívity, while
special preference structures are also not embedded by Ch1s choice of
constants.
The right-hand sides of the four systems contain the same variables.
The left-hand sides are different. Denote by y , y , y , y the Ri Ci Ai Ni
left-hand sídes of the Rotterdam system (48), of the CBS system (54),
of the AID system (49) and of the NBR system (55), respec[ively. One
then has
(~) yC1 - yRi ' w;(dln q{ - dln Q) - w{ dln q; --wi dln Q
(~b) yA1 - yCi - dw{ - w{(dln q; - dln Q) - w;(dln p; - dln P)
(~) yNi - yAi - dw; t w{ dln Q - dw; - w; dln Qzz
where use has been made of (50) and of (21). All other pairwise dif-
ferences can be constructed from these three expressions.
The traditíonal demand systems take the left-hand side variables as
exogeneous, i.e. dln Q, the change in real Sncome and dln p;, i- 1,
.. , n. This reflects the methodological starting point of demand al-
locatíon as choosíng quantities that maximize utility given the budget
m and the prices. IC follows from (21) that then also dln Q is exo-
genous. Both dln Q and dln P involve wi. Clearly dwi is endogenous.
Assuming lntertemporal independence exogenous levels are compatible
xi[h endogenous changes. Thus dln Q and dln P, and theír finite coun-
terparts, can indeed be taken to be exogenous. This also justifíes the
treatment of the differences in the left-hand sides of the systems
considered as exogenous, because they are defined in terms of exoge-
nous variables only - see (56). This property will be exploíted when
the systems are being compared and combined. First, however, we will
describe the data used for the actual comparison exercise.
6. T[~ DATA
The dataset used is the same as that of Barten and McAleer (1991). It
consists of annual observatíons of consumer expenditure and correspon-
ding prices for the Netherlands over the period 1921-1981. The origi-
nal data for 16 groups and servíces have been aggregated into four
maJor groups, namely Food (FOOD), Pleasure Goods (i.e. confectionery,
tobacco, drinks) (PLGD), Durables (DURA) and Remainder (RFSf).
The complete set of observations consists of four subsets :(i) 1921-
1939, taken from Barten (1966): (ií) 1948-1951, an unpublished up-date
of the data in Barten (1966) for that period: (111) 1951-1977, based
on data constructed by the Dutch Central Bureau of Statístics (CBS) -
see CBS (1982); and (iv) 1977-1981, which also orlginates from the CBS23
and is published in Van Driel and Hundepool (1984). The three poat-
1948 subperiods overlap by one year.
No attempt ia made to merge these four subsets ínto a single set. Thís
is not really necessary. For estimatíon purposes the models of the
precedíng section will be written in terms of first dífferences of the
varíables. For practical purposes ít Ss aimpler to pool the data wíth
estimated dummy varíables to absorb the 1939-1948 transition and the
1951 and 1977 shifts. Altogether, the sample consists of 54 observa-
tions i n first differences.
Given the rather long period, the data díaplay quite some variation.
The population doubled. To account for that. per capita expenditures
are used. Real income per capita increased by a factor three. S~b-
stantial príce íncreases occurred, specifically after 1948. Príces of
Durables rose less than the average, those of Remainder, whích inclu-
des quite some services, increased more than the average. Theae chan-
ges are reflected in variations in the budget shares. Table 1 gíves
the actual budget shares for the fírst and last years of the sample
and also their average Eor the whole sample.
Table 1: Selection Budget Sharea
FOOD PLGD DURA REST
1921 .34 .10 .23 .33
Mean .25 .09 .25 .40
1981 .13 .O6 .22 .58
Engel's law reflects itself nicely in the spectacular decrease ín the
budget share of FOOD, matched by the substantial íncrease in the bud-
get share of REST. There appears to be enough variation in the data
to allow differences ín empricial performance between different func-
tional forms to show up. A fírst impressíon of this can be obtalned
from the estimation experiment of the next sectíon.24
7. FSTIMATION OF Tl~ FOUR S1(SfF]6
In this section results are gíven for the estlmatíon of the four sys-
tems one-by-one. For the purpose of estimatlon the differentials have
been replaced by fínite fírst differences and the w; by the moving
average, wjt -(wj~ f w;t-~)~2. An intercept has been added to repre-
sent trends, such as changes in tastes over time. Additíve random dis-
turbances together wlth the data shíft dummy varíables complete the
specifícation. The disturbances are assumed to have a multivariate
normal dístributíon, independent across obaervations.
For reasona of comparability, all four systems have been estímated
with the homogeneity and symmetry conditions imposed. The negativity
conditíon is not taken ínto account because the AID and NBR systems
cannot be made to respect it. With the type of systems consídered
here, the adding-up condítion ia satisfied automatícally.
The systems have been estimated by the method of maxímum likelihood -
see Barten (1969) and Barten and Geyskens (1975) - using the DEMMOD
estímatíon package.
Table 2 gives the point estímates of the b; or c; and of the s;; and
r;;, together with their asymptotlc standard errors. To avoid
overburdening the reader with resulta the intercepts, the s;j or r;j
estimates for i~ j, the coefficients of the data shíft dummy
variables and various performance statístics have not been glven. For
each system the maximum logaríthmic líkelihood value ( lQ.V) Ss also
presented.25
Table 2- Selected Poin[ Eatimatea of the Four Sjstesa
ROT (~S AID NBR
bi s;; ci sii ci rii bi rii
FOOD .142 -.105 -.121 -.093 -.125 .102 .138 .091
(.o2s) (.023) (.023) (.021) (.023) (.ozo) (.o2s) (.022)
PLGD .069 -.049 -.026 -.049 -.025 .034 .070 .034
(.011) (.014) (.011) (.014) (.012) (.014) (.012) (.014)
DURA .561 -.029 .302 -.030 .301 .150 .560 .151
(.033) (.031) (.033) (.032) (.035) (.033) (.034) (.032)
REST .228 -.040 -.155 -.038 -.151 .192 .232 .190
(.o3s) (.o3s) (.034) (.o3s) (.o3s) (.036) (.o3s) (.040)
MLV 662.621 669.442 667.390 661.016
Economísts have built up their Sntuitíon around elasticitíea. To
compare the bi wíth the ci and the sii with the ryi these concepts
have been converted into elasticities using the formulae
(57) Tli - bi~wi Tli - ci~wi } 1
(58) Eii - Síi~wÍ Eii - rii~wi - 1 t Ri
based on (38). (40) and the defínitions of bi and sij in (41). The
elastícitíes are variable because the wi are variable. They have been
evaluated for the budge[ shares of Table 1. In view of the similari-
ties between polnt estimates Table 3 and 4 only report the income or
budget elasticities ni and the own substitution elasticities e;i for
ROT and AID.26
Table 3: Selected Elastícitlee for the Rotterdaa a~odel
1921 mean 1981 1921 mean 1981
FOOD .421 .566 1.060 -.312 -.418 -.784
Pi.GD .726 .758 1.095 -.516 -.538 -.778
DURA 2.397 2.209 2.538 -.124 -.114 -.131
RFS`!' .683 .564 .391 -.120 -.099 -.069
Table 4: Selected Elasticitiea for the AID a~odel
1921 mean 1981 1921 mean 19~81
FOOD .629 .504 .067 -.360 -.344 -.105
PLGD .737 .721 .603 -.547 -.533 -.39?
DURA 2.286 2.188 2.362 -.125 -.156 -.100
REST .548 .625 .741 -.091 -.121 -.088
It appears from Tables 3 and 4 that all the Eii are negatlve. There
is no conflict wíth the negativíty condition ín [his respect. In both
cases the Eii are rather small : no value less than -.8. For the mean
budget share and for 1921 the elasticities are rather similar for both
models. This contrasts with the considerable difference in the elas-
ticities for 1981. The rJ; values for that year indicate FOOD to be a
luxury ín the Rotterdam model and almost an inferior good for the AID
system. This is due to the rather low budget share for FOOD for 1981.
As is evident from (57) a decrease in wi increases the ni in the
Rotterdam and decreases St in the AID context for negative c;. Nhich
of these two sets of results are to be belíeved ? The maximum líkeli-
hood values of Table 2 glve little support for an answer to this ques-
tion. (BS appears to do best but is its dlfference wíth the others27
significant ? Note that all models have the same number of parameters
estimated, so difference ín performance ia not a matter of difference
ín degrees of freedom. The next sectíon !s concerned with a more
formal tes[.
8. PAIRWISE CAMPARISONS
The models considered in the preceding sections are not nested. They
are of the type
Yj t- Xt Qj t uj t
where the n-vector yjt represents the ~-th nonlinear data transforma-
tion of a vector of basic endogenous variables. The Xt ís a n x k
matrix of exogenous variables and (3j is a vector of ccefficients,
specifíc for each system. The n-vector ujt are disturbance terms.
Let ~ - 1,2 and construct the following general model
(ss) ai(Yit - XtQi) t az(YZC - Xt~z) - vt
No loss of generality !s involved by letting a~ t az - 1 or
a~ - 1- az. Thus the general model is
(1 - az)Ytt t azYZt - Xt ((1 - az)Ql t azQz) t vt
or
(~) Yit - Xt ((1 - az)~1 t azPz) t az(Y~t - Yzt) t vt
As poínted out before, for our set of models y1t - Yst is a vector of
exogenous varíables. One can thus very símply estimate az ín (60) and
test whether ít ís significantly different from zero. If ít is not,28
the second model cannot be missed in the general model: the first
model is not able to explain the data adequately.
Rather than lettíng a~ - 1- ax one can also have ax - 1- a~ and
obtain as counterpart of (60)
(61) yx o- Xc (ai Pi f(1 - a~ )Rx ) f ai (yx c- yi o) f ~c
If one rejects the null hypothesis a~ - 0 one re~ects [he second nodel
as a satisfactory explanation of reality.
One may observe that (60) and (61) are ldentical from the point of
víew of estímation, wlth al - 1- ax also for the estimatea. Otherwíse
said, one can use (60) to test the null hypothesea of ax - O(no con-
tribution from model 2) and of ax - 1(no contribution from model 1).
It can be verified easily that the ccefficients of the Xt in (60)
satisfy the adding-up conditions and can be made to satisfy the homo-
geneity and symmetry condltlons, but not the negatívity condítion ex-
cept when one considers the ROT-CBS pair. For all possíble pairs, (60)
has been estimated with (only) the homogeneity and symmetry condítions
explicitly imposed.
The DIIRMOD package does not allow straightforward maximum likelihood
estímation of the ax. The term ax(y~t - yx~) has therefore been moved
to the left-hand side of the system. For a given value of ax the sys-
tem was estimated by DII4MOD. Trial and error produced the maximizíng
value of this ccefflcient.
These are given in Table 5 together with theír asymptotíc standard
errors. The ~, ~C, áA, áN correspond with the ax of (60) when the
ROT, CBS. AID and NBR systems, respectively, are ín the role of the
second model. The table also gives the corresponding ínformation for
the four single systems and the maximum logarithmic likelihood values
for all the cases considered. The ML values of the first four systems
are those of Table 2.29
Table 5: Coefficíents a~ 1Q. Values for Single and Pairs of Syatees
System(s) aR aC aA ocW 1RLV
ROT 1 0 0 O 662.621
CBS 0 1 0 0 669.492
AID 0 0 1 O 667.390
NBR 0 0 0 1 661.016
ROT t CBS -.42 (.34) 1.92 (.34) 0 O 670.197
RO'f t AID .07 (.30) 0 .93 (.30) O 667.424
ROT t NBR .96 (.54) 0 0 .04 (.54) 662.623
CBS t AID 0 1.06 (.52) -.06 (.52) O 669.94?
CBS t NBR 0 1.35 (.32) 0 -.35 (.32) 670.086
AID t NBR 0 0 1.36 (.38) -.36 (.38) 667.935
The value of áC of 1.42 in the model that combínes ROT arxl CBS is the
value of the coefficient of the dífference between the vector of
dependent variables of ROT and that of CBSS wlth the former being on
the left-hand side. Under the null hypothesia of aC - 0, aR ia one.
Th1s is the case of the first system (ROT). One can compare the cor-
respondíng logarithmic líkelihood values. Twice their difference is
asymptotically distributed as K~ with one degree of freedom. For the
same combination, í.e. ROT t(~S one can also test whe[her ~--.42
is significantly different from zero. Under the null hypothesia of aR
being zero, aC is one which is the case of the second system (GBS).
For each combínatlon one has two llkelihood ratío atatlstícs (LRT).
All those statistícs are given ín Table 6.30
Table 6: 1RT Valuea for Paired Teats
Null Model Alternative Model
ROT C1~.S AID NBR
ROT - 15.2 9.6 O.0
CBS 1.5 - 0.0 1.3
AID 0.1 4.1 - 1.1
NBR 3.2 18.1 13.8
For 1 degree of freedom, the 5 and 1 per cent critícal value of the X~
distribution are 3.8 and 6.6, respectívely. A high value of the test
statistíc means that the null model needs the alternative model to
explaín the facts. One can also say that the alternative model rejects
the null model as a stand alone model. From Table 6 one can see that
at the 1 per cent significance level CBS rejects ROT and NBR and at
the 5 per cent level also AID. GBS itself Ss not being rejected by
any of the three other models. The NBR system does not reject any
other model and is ítself rejected by CBS and AID. It appears to be
the weakest of the four. Clearly, CBS ía the strongest with AID and
ROT in the second and thírd posl[ion. Thís global picture corresponds
with that of McAleer and Barten (1991) for the same data but with a
different test set-up. There, however. AID and ROT were virtually at
a par.
In interpreting these results one may note that the models performíng
best have both the AID type íncome coeffícients. They differ ín the
price coeffícients. AID has, of course, AID type price coeffícíents
but (~S has ROT type price coefficienta. It may be that AID type in-
come coefficients perform better than the ROT type ones and thac che
ROT type price coefficients are in thSs respect better than the AID
type counterparts. The next section will treat thls issue more
explicitly.31
9. HIQQ7t ORI)F72 Ca!(PARISONS
There is no reason to limit the general model to a palr as in (59).
One may write more generally :
(61) aRyRt } aCYCt } aAyAt } aTIYNt ' Xt' t v1
where 7- aR~R t aGjiC t aA(3A t aN(3N. Agaín here one may normalize by
letting the aj add up to one. One can eliminate aR from (61) in this
way. The resulting extended version of (60) Ss
(62) yRt - Xc~ t aC(YRt-YCt) t aA(YRt-YAt) t~(YRt-YNt) t wc
Setting aC - 1, aA - an - 0 one has the CBS system. Analogous specí-
fications hold for the AID and NBR systems. R07' corresponds with all
three a's being zero. The first three pairwise combinations of Table
5 of the preceding sectíon correspond with two of [he a's in (62)
equal to zero and the third one being estímated. The second set of
three palrwlse combinations eatimated a pair of the a'e but with their
sum restricted to uníty.
Conceptuaily, one can extend the procedure of the preceding section by
estimating (62) wíth two or three degrees of freedom for the a's.
There is a problem, however. For the systems considered, relations
(56) hold, which imply
or
(~)
yRt - yCt } yAt - yNt - D
(yRt-yCt) - (yRt-yAt) t (yRt-yNt) - 0
This means that the three additional variables !n (62) are perfectly
collinear. Unconstrained estímation of the three a's of (62) ís not
possible.32
One can use (64) to rewrite (62) as
(~) yRt - Xt7 f (aCtaA)(YRt-yCt) f(aA~)(YRt-yNt) t ~t
- Xt7 t ói(YRt-yCt) t óz(YRt-yNt) t ~c
Three observations can be made. First, there are only two degrees of
freedom available. Equation (60) of the preceding section can only be
extended by one extra variable. Second, the a's cannot be identified
from the ó~ and ba. The other way around is clear. One can calculate
the SI and óy values correspondíng with the á of Table 5- see e.g.
Table 7 below. Third, the way (65) is written lets ó1 be the cceffi-
cient associated with the difference between the ROT and the CBS sys-
tems, í.e. with the difference in the specification of the income
coefficíent. The estimate of SI reflects the empirlcal ímportance of
this difference in parametrization. The Sg is associated with the díf-
ference between the ROT type and AID type price ccefficíents, because
it is only in that respect that ROT and NBR differ. So also the impact
of that difference can be measured separately.
The estímated version of (65) is
yRt - Xt7 t 1.43 (YRt-yCt) -.12 (YRt-YNt) t"t
(.~) (.53)
The MLV ís 670.221. One should realíze that á~ - 1 corresponds with
AID type income coefficients and óp - 1 wíth AID type price coeffí-
cients. Zero's indicate ROT type of coefficients. As (66) shows, the
sample favours AID type income coeffícients and ROT type price coeffi-
cients. This conclusion agrees with the strong performance of (~,5,
whích combínes theae two typca of cocfficients, ín Table 6.
One can use (66), índícated by SYfi, as the alternative model to test
the null hypothesis of the models presented earlier. Table 7 summa-
rizes the relevant information about these models.33
Table 7: Coefficients of General Model (66) aird Teat Statietics
Systems ói bp MLV LRT
ROT 0 0 662.621 15.2~~
CBS 1 0 669.442 1.6
AID 1 1 667.390 5.7
NBR 0 1 661.016 18.4~~
ROT t(~S 1.42 (.34) 0 670.197 .0
ROT t AID .93 (.30) .93 (.30) 667.424 5.6"
ROT t NBR 0 .04 (.54) 662.623 15.2'i
GBS } AID 1 -.06 (.52) 669.447 1.5
CBS t NBR 1.35 (.32) -.35 (.32) 670.086 .3
AID t NBR 1.36 (.38) 1 667.935 4.6~
SYN 1.43 (.34) -.12 (.53) 670.221 -
' significant at 5 per cent signifícance level
' sígnificant at 1 per cent significance level.
From Table 7 the artificial nesting procedure is clear. The ó~ and Sy
parametrize the differences between the various models. The last líne
glves the results for the general model of which the precedíng systems
are special cases. The last column gives the values of the líkelihood
ratío test statistic for the model in question as the null model and
(66) as the alternative model. For the first four models two degrees
of freedom are involved. For the other models only one degree of
freedom has been used up.
The (asymptotically valid) test results show that SYIV rejects ROT and
NBR as single models fírmly. Accordingly, it also rejects the combi-
nation of ROT and NBR. SYN almost reJects AID as a single model. AID
combined with ROT or NBR cannot raise the likelíhood enough to avoid
reJection of these combinations. The most salient feature is the
strength of CBS. It is not rejected by SYIV. Moreover, none of com-
binations of (~S with the other models ís rejected.34
In fact, GBS, standing alone, fits the data not signífícantly worse
than any of the other models or combinations of these models. lnclu-
ding those with CBS itself. Still, SYN is a generalízation of CBS
- and for that matter oF the other models as well - which could be
consSdered as a demand system in its own right with two extra degrees
of freedom to better adjust to the data. This aspect is further ela-
borated ín the next sectíon.
10. A SYKi'ElE['IC SYS7'II~I
One can consider (65) as a demand system. This becomes somexhat more
clear if one realizes that
(YRt - YCt)~ - wic ~ ln Qc
(YRt - YNt)i -(YCt - YAt)i -- wit (G ln Pic - A ln Pc)
where (56) and (63) are employed. Use of these relatíons results Sn
the typical demand equatíon
(67) sii A ln qit - ál wi~ ~ ln Q~ t ó~ wi~ (A !n p;t - A ln Pt)
- constanti t di A ln Qt t Ej e;j A ln pj t f vi t
wíth the rlght-hand síde, apart from vii, being the explicit form of
the i-th element of X~7. Here, the adding-up conditions for the di
and the eij are
(~) Eidi - 1- ó; Eieij - 035
Since the expresslon on the lefc-hand side of (67) ís homogeneous of
degree zero in the príces, one should have on the right-hand aide the
homogenetty condttton :
(69) Ej eqj - O
A further ínspection of the properties of the coeffícíents can be
conveniently done with the following variant of (67)
(70) w;t o ln q;t - constantí t(d; t óiw;t) 0 ln Qt,
t Ej (ei j- bs wi c(b1 j - wj t)) n ln pj c t ví c
It ís then easy to see that the income or budget elastícíty ~; ís
(71) Tli -(di t ótwit) ~ wit - d; ~ wit t bt
and the Slutsky substitutíon elasticity e;j is given by
(72) e;j -(e;j-óawit(ó;j-wjt)) ~ w;t - e;j ~ w;t - Óy(b;j-wjt)
Clearly, symmetry of w~te;j ín 1 and j requires symmetry of e;j. The
symmetry conditton can be ímposed in the same way as in the origlnal
elementary models. The negatívity condltion can only be guaranteed
when óy - 0.
As the precedíng discussion has made clear the elementary models spe-
cify dl and b~ to be either zero or one. Expressions (71) and (72)
offer somewhat more flexibility. It is one step on the way towards
loosening the strait jacket of functional rigidity of the systems ap-
proach which is the butt of the Johansen (1981) complaint. As one can
see from (71), wíth negative d; and positive bl a good can be a luxury
for high values of w;t and an ínferior good for sufficíently low va-
lues of ir;t. The reverse ís true for positive d; and negative b~.
If d; and ót are both positive the elasticíty is on the range
(d~ t ó~, m) which ís positive. If they are both negative the range36
is (-m, di t ó~) and thus negative, i.e. good i is an inferior good.
For e;j one has a similar type of adaptability - the sign of e;j is in
part dependent on the value taken by [he varíable vrj~. With changing
budget shares a pair of goods can turn from (Hicksian) complements
ínto (Hickslan) substitutes. Of course, a negative e;; can turn ínto
a positive one, which is the undeaírable aspect of flexibility.
Table 8 presents the polnt estimates of the íncome and own price co-
efficients of the synthetíc system along the same lines as Table 2 for
the elementary systema. The d; are somewhat more negative or less
positive than the c; of Table 2. The ei; are also more negative than
the s;; of Table 2. The standard errors are roughly the same as those
of that table. These standard erros are conditional ones. They are
obtained for ó~ and bz fixed at their estimated values.














Of course the d; and eij are conceptually different from the b; and
s;j and the c; and r;j, respectively. To compare their estimates they
have been converted ínto elasticities using (71) and (72) and the
value of the Dudget shares of Table 1. Like in Tables 3 and 4, Table 9limits itself to the income or budget elasticlties and the own price
substitution elastícities.
Table 9 - Selected Elasticities for the Sjrnthetic Sjrstes
1921 Mean 1981 1921 Mean 1981
FOOD . 736 .498 -.316 -.256 -.360 -.739
PLGD .714 .683 . 351 -.512 -.539 -.824
DURA 2.246 2.182 2.294 -. 135 -.119 -.146
RES'f .472 .638 .881 -.112 -.087 -.060
Comparing the elasticities of Table 9 with those of Tables 3 and 4 one
notices a somewhat greater variability across the data poínts used for
evaluation. The estimation of bt and by has indeed resulted in a
greater flexíbility. The negative budget elasticity for FOOD for 1981
is a consequence of this. It is somewhat difficult to fully accept it
as realistic. Given the 1lmítatíons of the S~nthetic Sj~stem, however,
this outcome maximízes the líkelihood, is the most realistíc. To avoid
it a further increase in flexíbility may be needed.
11. ODNQ.UDING RF?1ARKS
Demand systems allocate a given total budget over a set of commodítíes
taking into account the effects of príce variation. They are a tool
in the hands of the demand analyst to describe and predict empírical
consumer behaviour, for a whole economy or for índividual consumptíon
units. They are based on the mícrceconomic theory of individual con-
sumer behaviour, whích supplies varlous restrictiona on the allocatíon38
system. These are not sufficíent to determine the functional form.
Four alternative approaches to the functional specification have been
sketched, with well-known demand systems as illustrations. A parti-
cular choice of constants can be judged from a theoretical point of
víew, but clearly empirícal considerations are of no less importance.
Comparing alternatíve specifícatíons empirlcally can be and has been
done usíng some goodness-of-fit críteria. Still, the statistícal in-
terpetation of that approach ís not clear. Statístlcal test procedures
have to take into account that mostly the models compared are not
nested within each other.
One approach is the varíable addition method of McAleer (1983) which
was extended to combination of vector valued functions by Barten and
McAleer (1991) and applied to a comparison of a set of four related
demand systema, namely the Rotterdam syatem, the Almost Ideal Demand
system, the CBS system and the NBR system, usíng data for The
Netherlands 1921-1981. Barten and McAleer studied linear combinations
of these sytems using matríces to weíght the various members. This has
the advantage of allowíng for detailed interactions. The linear
combinations are, however, themselves not typical demand systems
because they cannot be made to satísfy Slutsky symmetry.
This is dífferent when one restricts oneself to linear combínations
with acalar weights. These combinations can be taken as demand systems
in their own right. Thís is the approach taken in the present paper.
where the same set of models and the same set of data as ín the
Barten-McAleer paper has been used. Given the nature of the dependent
varíables of the four systems considered, the test basically reduces
to assessing the extra explanatory power of vectors of exogenous
varíables. The Líkelíhood Ratío Test statistíc can be used for thís
purposes. As it turns ou[ the GBS model performs best.
One of the alternatives in the testing set-up is a combination of all
four systems. This Synthetic System nests not only the four elementary
systems but also all combínations of two or three of those systems.Jy
It. is a demrtnd system in its own ríght. It has two deRroea of freedom
more than the elementary systems to adjust to the data and is there-
fore somewhat more flexible. For the sample used, however, it performa
not significantly better than the CBS system on its own.
The fact that the Synthetic System does not outperform the (~SS system
in a particular sample does not mean that is a useless generalizatíon.
Other samples may yield other findings. The increased flexíbility is
an advantage on its own. As a representation of a class of differen-
tial demand functions it can, moreover, serve also a theoretical pur-
pose.40
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